BlargenBlog

So I sent in my first paper for my philosophy class.  We’re supposed to write six papers throughout the semester, and I apparently missed the announcement that it was due this week, so I ended up having to scramble to get it turned in.  At any rate, I don’t think it turned out too horribly.  Enjoy:

This essay is in response to the The Wager by Blaise Pascal, in which the author attempts to make the case for the rationality of belief in God.  While his argument does assert God exists, he does not seek to prove it, but only to make the claim that God’s existence is possible in the abstract though not empirically provable.  Once this is established, the author contends belief is more rational than disbelief in that one has an infinite prize to be won and comparatively superficial, finite thing to lose by choosing to believe in God—but places nothing infinite at risk.  In contrast, by choosing to disbelieve one has nothing to lose or gain if God doesn’t exist, but risks losing an infinite prize if God does exist.

 

Supporting the claim, Pascal correctly states that we must necessarily make this wager.  The core tenet of his argument rests in the odds of winning versus the cost of losing.  According to Pascal,”if you win you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing.”  He asserts that since we must play anyway, we’re better off placing our bets on the outcome which may yield positive results.  Indeed, he goes even further in saying it is foolish not to bet on even a small reward if we have nothing to lose in a game we’ve no choice but to play.

 

Overall, I think he made his points well.  It is reasonable to argue that if given a choice between A and B, in which A has the potential for a positive outcome whereas B does not, A becomes the rational choice.  This is made even more rational when B is not only devoid of the possibility of a positive outcome, but carries the potential for a negative, undesirable result.  This is especially true of the Christian religion (from which perspective Pascal is arguing), where belief in God yields eternal rewards while disbelief results in eternal punishment, and no neutral result is possible.  In essence, it very effectively manipulates the fear of punishment as an incentive for belief. 

 

I do not agree with the conclusions of The Wager.  The principal flaw in the argument is that it is far too specific.  While hedging your bets against eternal damnation might seem like a good idea to many Christians, Zeus, Brahman, Odin, Thor and Allah might not share the same perspective.  Even if we were to apply the argument to a different religion, Indian followers of Vishnu are in for more than a bit of a surprise if they die and find out the real god is the Christian God, and he commands no other gods be worshipped.  The bet loses its nothing-to-lose appeal once other religions are factored in.  How might he have explained this, given the fact that the vast majority of religious beliefs occur only as an accident of birth (that is to say, it is unlikely one would be a devout Christian had he been born in, for example, an Islamic nation, or into a family with such beliefs and vice versa)?   My second objection to the argument is that I cannot force myself to believe anything whether it is logical to believe or whether I truly desire to believe.  I think it would be wonderful if genies existed to grant my wishes, but no matter how much I want it to be true, I cannot bring myself to actually believe in it.  While I cannot technically disprove the existence of magic genie lamps, I find it highly unlikely they exist.  What Pascal’s Wager is encouraging is to feign belief, something a deity with the powers commonly attributed to the Judeo-Christian god would most certainly not be fooled by.

Tags: Philosophy, School

This entry was posted on Friday, September 12th, 2008 at 3:33 pm and is filed under Religion, School. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.